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Fragmented Historiography: 		
Sniffing out Literature in a Sharp-nosed Historian 
Christopher Tuplin 
 
 
The primary aspiration of Occhipinti’s book1 is to offer a literary study of the Hellenica 
Oxyrhyncia (hereafter HO2), though Occhipinti (hereafter O.) is also concerned with 
evaluating it in relation to fifth and fourth century historiography and as a source for 
Diodorus.  Part I deals directly with HO’s interactions with other authors and with location 
in the historiographical tradition. Part II deals with historical themes—polypragmosunē, land 
and sea, hegemony, causation and moralism (the first three are decidedly 
interconnected)—but still persistently focuses on where HO stands in relation to other 
authors.  Sometimes the result is lengthy discussion of those authors with little said about 
HO. That is particularly true in chapter 7 (on historical authors learning ways of reading 
historical events from orators), from which there is little to be learned about HO that does 
not appear elsewhere in the book. Where HO is more fully in sight, the discussion is 
sometimes relatively unproblematic. Chapter 9 argues that “morality” in HO and 
Thucydides is primarily there to enhance understanding of why things happen,3 although, 
unlike Thucydides, he has no broader concern for human behaviour and psychology: there 
are no general truths about human phusis, and the primary focus is immediate contingency. 
By contrast Xenophon and Theopompus do want to be inspirational and uplifting (if often 
by being admonitory): where HO exhibits explanatory moralism, Xenophon exhibits 
descriptive and prescriptive as well as explanatory moralism, and Theopompus exhibits 
just descriptive and prescriptive moralism (p.228). (Ephorus’ position remains opaque.)  
Generally speaking this rings true, though the contrast with Thucydides may owe a lot to 
the fact that the surviving bits of HO contain no speeches (not that we know any of it did) 
and it should be stressed that the number of moral flourishes in HO is rather limited.  
 
HO, Xenophon and Diodorus 
 
One of O’s major aims is to locate HO as (i) a reader of Xenophon and (ii) an object read by 
Diodorus.  The former is an important issue because of its implications for the dating of HO, 
especially as O. espouses a 350s date for Hellenica (with which I have no quarrel). But the 
evidence that HO was a reader of Hellenica is not pressing. Nothing about HO’s comments on 
Athenian polypragmosunē (10.2) or Theban conspiracy (21) makes them conspicuously a 
response to Xenophon’s talk of Spartan pleonexia (3.5.15) or his version of Theban 
																																								 																				
1 E.Occhipinti, The Hellenica Oxyrhyncia and Historiography. Leiden: Brill. 2016. pp. xiii + 303. ISBN 978-
90-04-32571-5 (hardback), 978-90-04-32578-4 (e-book).  
2  I use this both for the title and the work’s author. I cite the work according to the numeration of 
chapters in Chambers 1993 edition. O. oddly sticks with Bartoletti, and treats the Cairo papyrus (HO 1-3 in 
Chambers) as a free-standing item. 
3  In the book’s concluding chapter we read that “explanatory moralism consists in explaining ethical 
conducts” which sounds disconcertingly different from moralism as a way of explaining why things 
happened. But perhaps the formulation is misleading. 
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chicanery. It is unfair to turn Xenophon into a simple proponent of the view that 
Timocrates’ gold caused the war (which he is not) in order to announce that HO’s rejection 
of this is a rejection of Xenophon. Comparison of 24.3 and Hellenica 4.1.1 (p.51) does not 
demonstrate that HO is responding to Xenophon: HO’s statement that Agesilaus did not 
invade the part of Phrygia he had invaded the previous summer but attacked a different 
area has no particular Xenophontic resonance, and, while the fact that Xenophon speaks of 
Agesilaus capturing cities, whereas the HO narrative is notable for his failure to do so is 
prima facie a contradiction it is not necessarily a response, and may be a sign that they are 
talking about different phases of the campaign. Similarly saying “Agesilaus did not go back 
the way he came [through Mysia], but went by another route, because he thought crossing 
the Sangarius would be less tiring” is not obviously a specific response to “Xenophon’s 
generic treatment of the topographic information pertaining to that campaign” (p.54). It is 
indeed notorious that Agesilaus’ activities as a whole look different in HO and Hellenica. But 
O. does not seem to have found any new and compelling reasons to show that HO is 
correcting Xenophon.  
It is also interesting how often O. does not claim to detect a specific response. There is 
nothing about the two authors’ different identification of the Locrians who were in dispute 
with Phocis. At pp.33-34 O. perhaps means to say  (but does not) that HO on Spartan 
diplomacy contradicts Xenophon’s claim that the “Spartans were delighted to have excuse 
to attack Thebes” (3.5.5).  Xenophon (3.5.5) and HO (20.3) make a different connection 
between Decelea and the outbreak of the war (a matter of interest to O: see below), but 
there is no overt suggestion of an intertextual link. (Rather it is simply a reason for pitting 
Hellenica and HO against Thucydides.) The treatment of the three way interaction between 
HO, Xenophon and Diodorus in chapter 4 yields no new claims about HO’s reading of 
Xenophon; and O. does not consider how her assessment of HO’s view of Conon (see below) 
might sit in relation to Xenophon: perhaps she thinks they are too close for there to be any 
interesting tension, but some comment seems called for. The same goes for contrasting or 
complementary uses of the “Cyrus-topic” (see below). If we knew what order the texts came 
in we could have a field-day decoding the interconnections, but we do not know and 
probably can never prove an answer by this sort of approach. But, if we were going to be 
able to do so, it would require a painstaking and systematic discussion of a sort that O. does 
not provide. 
As for Diodorus, O. provides discussion both in chapter 4 and elsewhere. It is worth 
asking why we need a discussion of the relationship between Diodorus and HO in a book 
about the latter. One possible answer is that we have to decide what sort of evidence 
Diodorus can provide about HO at points at which HO is lost or fragmentary.  Another is 
that a demonstration that Diodorus was reading HO would say something about the 
continuing status of the text in first century BC Rome. These are distinct answers leading to 
distinct enterprises and in each case the discussion needs to be clearly framed in the 
appropriate terms and conducted systematically. But this does not really happen. Instead 
we get a series of case studies which investigate the inter-relationship between HO, 
Diodorus and Xenophon in detail but from a general perspective. And neither here nor 
elsewhere do we get something required by both enterprises, that is an explicit treatment 
of the Ephorus problem: we need to know whether there is sufficient engagement between 
genuine Ephoran fragments and HO to give any direction on how to conduct a comparison 
of Diodorus and HO that might allow us to distinguish between Diodorus consuming HO 
direct and consuming it via Ephorus. I do not think it is good enough just to say that 
modern scholarship is more open to the idea that Diodorus read and combined a variety of 
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sources rather than simply epitomising a single source, in the present context Ephorus.4 O. 
needs to display the evidence that this can be true in the particular case she is interested 
in. I am not sure such evidence can be produced, but we need to see a conscious attempt to 
find it. Meanwhile, so far as the first question goes (can Diodorus be a substitute for a 
fragmentary or absent HO?), the impression created by the case studies is negative: the 
discrepancies where parallel text survives are sufficiently numerous to problematize 
Diodorus as a reliable source about HO, at least at any interestingly detailed level. In fact 
the discrepancies are more numerous than they were before, since O. produces a new 
supplement of HO’s battered account of the battle of Notium that provides a further 
disagreement between HO and Diodorus. (Rather curiously p.243 makes this new 
supplement a reason in favour of supposing that Diodorus used HO without mediation.) 
 
Literary features 
 
O. aspires to produce a literary and narratological study of HO, and in chapter 2 argues that 
the mixture of excursus, annalistic narrative, synchronism and ring composition in HO is 
“inspired by the Herodotean narrative model”. HO turns Herodotean because of the need to 
connect and associate different areas of the Afro-Eurasian oikoumene (p.29) and the 
extension of Hellas (and ta hellenika) to any deed performed by Greek people (p.16) -- “a sort 
of ethnical concept applied to space” (p.22). HO was thus a pioneer of a new historical 
tendency.5  
I think we can do without talk of ta hellenika: p.17 already virtually concedes that it is 
an over-broad concept, and one not specially helpful for distinguishing between fourth 
century narrative historians and Herodotus/Thucydides. As for the “ethnical concept” (i.e. 
the treatment of Hellas as anywhere where things happen that involve or matter to Greeks), 
it is a little unfortunate that the crucial words kata tēn Hellada in 12.1 are a restoration, not 
something in the papyrus; and Hellada is anyway surely drawing a distinction between 
Hellas in a fairly ordinary sense and the fleet- and Persian-related events along the shores 
of Anatolia and the East Mediterranean which are what seem to follow in the rest of 9. (It is 
the same use we find at e.g. Xenophon Hellenica 3.5.25.) 
But, leaving that technical matter aside, there might still be an issue about scope: p.18 
declares that Thucydides has tighter chronological and spatial boundaries than fourth 
century historical works, HO included. But one might say his boundaries were precisely as 
wide as he considered right for what he judged to be the components of his war. Can we 
really tell that HO represented anything fundamentally different in principle—or even 
much different in practice? He goes where the story of interactions between competing 
powers takes him. It is hard to feel sure the digressions on show in what survives of HO are 
on a par with Theopompus XII (or indeed Herodotus).  And as for other fourth century 
historians, the very limited spatial scope that Xenophon’s Hellenica came to have in VII by 
comparison with Thucydides or HO or the opening books of Hellenica itself is doubtless a 
Xenophontic eccentricity—but an eccentricity that enjoins wariness about generalisations 
about fourth century historiography.  That there is a certain Herodotean character in HO is 
																																								 																				
4 For the most recent example of this trend see J. Stronk, Semiramis’ Legacy (Edinburgh 2016). 
5 So was the interpolator of Xenophon’s Hellenica I-II, an interesting accolade for an individual of 
uncertain date who—perhaps rightly—rarely attracts that sort of attention. 
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just about an understandable claim at first sight, but O. herself rightly says (pp.27-28) that 
the components of the ring-composed bits of text in 10-11 and 19-21 (carefully analysed at 
pp.21-27) arise from an explanatory imperative, not from what she apparently sees as a 
Herodotean desire to produce narrative delay—and that univocal explanatory imperative is 
sufficiently Thucydidean to make the means that HO uses not particularly Herodotean. 
Readers of HO tend to think of him primarily as a Thucydidean author (or aspiring to be 
one) and O. has not really convinced me that this is not true.  
While on matters to do with narrative style, I note that, having identified ring 
composition, O. does not go on to explain or even comment on the strange way in which 
the pre-Timocrates hostility to Sparta of Athenians, Argives, Boeotians and Corinthians is 
asserted as a Chinese-box-like footnote to the Athenian war party’s retreat from its normal 
position at the time of Demaenetus’ mission.  That is, she does not really get to grips with 
the narrative habits of an author who can do something like this. Similarly, there is no 
comment on the fact that the narrative’s move from central Greece to the Aegean at 22.1 
and from Rhodes to Anatolia at 24.1 is abrupt and marked simply by de. This is neither 
explicit synchronism nor yet Herodotean. In 19.1 there is a reference to “this summer”, but 
it does not stand first in the sentence (and is not to “the same summer”), so the case is still 
not quite Thucydidean, even if the allusion to the season does soften the bluntness of a de 
transition. (Of course, 12.1 does indicate the use of a winters-and-summers framework.)  
Note incidentally that most of the temporal phrases listed at pp.21-22 are not structural 
ones or markers of synchronisms between significantly different contexts.  Of course, while 
(as things stand) it is probably true that “HO’s annalistic framework is not perspicuous” 
(p.22), this may simply be because we lack a sufficiently long piece of perfectly preserved 
text to figure out how the switches of location not marked with a seasonal phrase are 
supposed to be understood chronologically. (Not that the actual presence of a seasonal 
phrase guarantees perspicuity either.) Still, a more systematic identification of features of 
narrative structure and an explicit demonstration that there are some that we simply 
cannot assess properly would be preferable to a treatment that can seem as though it does 
not really recognize the problem. Meanwhile, it should also be observed that O.’s literary 
study of HO includes virtually no commentary on the lexical and syntactical aspects of the 
author’s style. HO is sometimes perceived as a rather clumsy writer, something that has 
enhanced his standing as serious writer of history—a grubber of facts, not a spinner of 
elegant rhetorical webs. On this O. has nothing to contribute. 
  
Persian perspective 
 
It is certainly true that there was a larger amount of detail about activities by Persian 
individuals than in the corresponding parts of Xenophon’s Hellenica, not least in chapters of 
HO that survive in very damaged form such as 12.2-3, 16.1-2, and O. is inclined to presume 
Persian sources. Something like the actual execution of Tissaphernes has to have come 
ultimately from a Persian source because it happened in private and well away from Greek 
view; and it is possible HO had a wider information stream coming from the Persian side, 
though patterns of focalisation in the well-preserved bits of text do not strike me as 
demanding such a view.6 In any case, specific claims need careful assessment. For example, 
																																								 																				
6 Whether O. rightly envisages Persian written sources, speaking on p.115 of Persian letters, reports 
and official documents, is another matter. 
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I do not see that the Mysian narrative is particularly moulded by “Greek and Persian 
perceptions” (p.39: my emphasis)—the only reference to Persians being a statement that 
Mysians were not subject to the king (24.2). It is only after the march through Mysia that 
Persian connections resume (via Spithradates and operations against Rhathanes at 
Gordium) and the question of Persian sources arises again. 
One specific Persian theme that O. evokes more than once is the so-called “Cyrus-
topic”. By this she means the role of the career of the younger Cyrus as a historical point of 
reference, something encountered in e.g. Isocrates, Xenophon’s Hellenica and Polybius. HO 
22 certainly brings Conon and Cyrus together: indeed analysis of the text rather neatly 
discloses a piece of ring composition with Cyrus at its heart, so the suggestion that Conon 
resembled the pre-404 Cyrus in his concern for financially underpinned naval efficiency is 
underlined by literary rhetoric. But it is much more debatable that a reference to Cyrus (as 
dēmotikōtatos) should be discovered in 17.2 (pp.44, 59): O. says that the passage pictures 
Cyrus and his army “very close to the Greek side, or even as Greeks themselves”. Readers of 
Xenophon’s Anabasis (1.7.3) might recall Cyrus’ praise of Greek liberty—though O. does not 
mention the passage, perhaps because she is taking dēmotikōtatos as synonymous with 
philostratiōtēs (from a different part of Anabasis: 7.6.4) or because freedom is a different 
thing from populism. But in any case I cannot see any strong reason why HO 17 should be 
about a Persian at all. The presence of the word dunasteuontes does not require such an idea, 
for, as O. points out, it actually belongs in a Greek political environment quite easily. The 
reason this matters is that O. wants to claim that in HO the Cyrus-topic was applied to 
Agesilaus as well as Conon and had some bearing on Agesilaus’ plans for military incursions 
into the interior of Anatolia. Quite what bearing—and how it resembles or differs from 
Xenophon’s allusions to the story of the Ten Thousand in Hellenica—remains a little elusive. 
But I am not convinced that there is any actual evidence of Agesilaus as deutero-Cyrus in 
the first place. 
 
Hegemony 
 
Talk of Conon takes us to the theme of hegemony. O. argues that HO dissents from the view 
that Conon was responsible for a renaissance of Athenian naval power.  On a wider front 
she also argues that both HO and Xenophon distance themselves from Thucydides’ reading 
of Athenian empire and Athenian hegemonic aspirations. Symbolically a Thucydidean 
Decelea-Sicily pattern (reflecting the centrality of maritime aspirations) is replaced by a 
Decelea-Thebes pattern: this reflects an unprecedented attention to “continental 
scenarios”, i.e. privileging the importance of federations (hence the famous description of 
the Boeotian federal constitution) and other forms of continental power, and seeing the sea 
as a barrier and a means of isolation—and therefore a weaker basis for hegemony than 
control of land. “There is a common interest in land scenarios and land hegemony that 
makes the Oxyrhyncus historian’s view very close to Xenophon’s” (p.141); and “the idea 
that it is better for a state to hold hegemony of land, because as a consequence this gives to 
that state also sea control, comes up in their narrative pretty often, directly or indirectly” 
(p.242).   
In the light of this it perhaps hardly matters much whether or not Conon re-
empowered Athens as a maritime power. But the truth of the matter is not easy to 
establish. In what survives of HO’s text Conon is very much the servant of Persia, and the 
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association with Cyrus underlines that fact.  O. pictures HO’s Conon as unconnected with 
the politics of Athens. The fact that pro-war Athenians had been sending help to him even 
before the Demaenetus affair certainly does not prove anything about the nature of the link; 
but one has to wonder whether they would have been as willing or able to assist a Persian 
force that did not have the advantage of being led by a fellow Athenian. One of the likely 
benefits were one ever to have a full text of HO, would precisely be further hints about the 
relations between Conon and his home city before he returned there in 393. Would not a 
detailed historical narrative surely be less black-and-white than fourth century oratory, 
whether the sort that saw Cnidus as a Persian victory or the sort that ascribed Athens’ 
renaissance to Conon?  Well, perhaps O. would answer in the negative, since she sees 
historians as vulnerable to the simplifications of orators, particularly when it comes to 
reducing the real complexities of individual political positioning to binary oppositions of 
the sort found in HO 10.2. (The resemblance between that passage and Diod. 13.53.1 is well 
known, and the theme is one to which O. returns several times, even postulating along the 
way that Diodorus’ use of such political modelling may be influenced by its Roman 
equivalent.) But, since (a) we already learn unparalleled details about Conon and Athens 
from HO, (b) HO is generally assumed to have been consistently in the business of providing 
a historical narrative rich with circumstantial details, and (c) he is also an author with a 
taste for back- and cross-references, no amount of orator-like simplification of political 
analysis precludes the revelation of further data complicating Conon’s status as deutero-
Cyrus. Indeed, if we take the Cyrus-topic seriously, we might affirm that a deutero-Cyrus 
should precisely be a “Persian” grandee with strong mainland Greek political links. 
As for larger questions about the nature of hegemony, O’s downplaying of the sea in 
HO’s vision of history seems prima facie odd. There is certainly plenty of sea-related activity 
in the surviving narrative, and no obvious reason to think a complete text would have been 
strongly biased against it, just because the outbreak of fighting in central Greece and 
Agesilaus’ Anatolian campaign happen to be well preserved in our fragments. (The solemn 
listing of toponyms and demonstration that most come from land-based operations in 
pp.126, 139-140 really proves nothing about HO as a whole.)  So far as Xenophon’s Hellenica 
goes, the separate treatment of land- and sea-narrative in the Corinthian War is not a 
downplaying of the maritime perspective; if anything, it stresses that that is the perspective 
that produces a conclusion of the war in Sparta’s favour; and, if Sparta asserts her new 
hegemonic status with operations in mainland Greece, the challenges to it after Hellenica 
5.4.1 do involve the sea as well as the land. The very real removal of the maritime 
perspective in Hellenica VII is quite startling in terms of earlier parts of the work (never 
mind of the total politico-military story of the time), and reflects a Xenophontic 
historiographical choice that is rather personal. It is true that Xenophon’s Thebans do offer 
Athens a prospect of sea and land hegemony in 395 (3.5.13), Jason does assert the advantage 
of land-based hegemony (more resources are available from mainland ethnē than from 
islets), and the debate in Hellenica VI/VII about the sharing of land and sea hegemony seems 
(and is meant to seem) outmoded and unproductive. There is an issue here in fourth 
century political ideas and actuality: this was an era in which hegemony was claimed by 
non-maritime states. Of course, Sparta twice got hegemony by buying naval power from 
the Persians and her subsequent weakness at sea did her no favours, some Thebans saw 
their own non-maritime character as a liability (but failed to cure it) and Philip’s eventual 
success depended on effective Athenian naval power being thwarted by lack of resources 
and political constraints. But the world that Thucydides took for granted had indeed gone. 
All the same, it is not obvious that O. has proved HO to have had a distinctive or particular 
stake in this historical issue. The search for maritime hegemony was unpopular in some 
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Athenian circles in 350s/340s, but, even if this led HO to articulate the politics of 390s 
Athenian anachronistically (which is far from certain: see below), neither that or nor any 
other features of the surviving text drives us to the conclusion that he had consciously 
bought into a new historical overview of the period. 
One such other feature is the supposed distinctive role of Decelea.  The claim is that 
Thucydides associates Decelea with Sicily (a major naval expedition), whereas HO (10.4, 
20.3, 22.1) and Xenophon connect Decelea with Thebes (a land power), and that Decelea is 
brought up in HO 20.3 because HO realized that the last phase of the PW changed the 
balance of power and made it possible for a continental power to hold hegemony in the 
Aegean and mainland Greece (pp.116-119).  This is not especially persuasive. 
For Thucydides Decelea is a consequence of the Alcibiades-related fall-out from the 
Sicilian expedition, so is naturally located in that (maritime hegemony) context: it provides 
a land-based response—which is essentially nothing new but just what you expect of 
Sparta. (The epiteichismos element, of course, comes from Alcibiades.)  Later Xenophon 
(Hellenica 1.1.35) reports that, looking out from Decelea, Agis saw Athenian corn-ships, 
concluded that land-based blockade of Athens was pointless, and ordered a maritime 
operation against Byzantium and Chalcedon: here Decelea is as much a symbol of the old 
order as the new. The other salient Xenophontic reference is Hellenica 3.5.5, where 
irritation about the seizure of the Apollo dekatē in Decelea is one among four grievances the 
Spartans have against Thebes, causing them to desire war with her. That is an interestingly 
different way of linking Decelea with the outbreak of the Corinthian War from HO’s (see 
elsewhere), but is not obviously symbolic in the way O. claims.7  Two of HOs’ references 
occur in the context of maritime activity.8 The third (20.4-5) is a passage noting that the 
whole Peloponnesian War, but especially the Decelean period from 414-404, had benefited 
Thebes demographically and economically and so empowered the pro-Spartan faction in 
the city. This point arises because the factional politics of Thebes becomes important for 
Hellenic events. This does not imply a fundamentally different historiographical outlook. 
At most it is an aspect of the fact (already noted) that the absolute destruction of Athenian 
(naval) power opened the way for non-naval states to have hegemonic aspirations.  
Historiographically it would be at least as pertinent and interesting to comment on the fact 
that HO reports on the prosperity of Thebes here rather than in the narrative of the 
Decelean War itself or of Theban interactions with Athens in 404-403—assuming that the 
absence of a back-reference proves that the matter had not been broached earlier.  One 
might say that HO reserves it on the basis that Thebes’ forcing of open war with Sparta was 
such an important historical watershed (and more important than her support of Athenian 
democratic exiles).  Still, it seems a little odd to rehearse the empowerment of pro-Spartan 
Thebes at the moment at which anti-Spartan Thebes really comes to the fore—odd and 
perhaps even deliberately paradoxical. But, as usual the fragmentary state of the text, 
makes it impossible to see a large enough context to assess what games HO may be playing 
with his readers. (Perhaps it helps cast light on why the anti-Spartan faction might be 
afraid enough of the pro-Spartan one to bring on a war as a way of protecting them against 
Spartan intervention to their detriment.)  
 
																																								 																				
7  Elsewhere in Hellenica Decelea is a refuge for escaped prisoners (in 1.2.14 and 1.3.22) or mentioned 
neutrally as the place where Agis was based. 
8 10.3-4 refers to the Corinthian Timolaus’ naval activities during Decelean War; and the war is 
mentioned at 22.2 in re the King’s poor financing of anti-Athenian fleet. 
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Causation 
 
O’s conclusion about causation is that HO is at one with Thucydides’ way of seeing the 
matter (p.197). Broadly speaking, that is an understandable view, but a number of details 
deserve comment. 
The observation in 21.2 that the Thebans cannot make war on Sparta ek phanerou (and 
so devise a trick to make it happen) is compared with Thucydides’ “truest cause but 
unclearest in logos” (pp.168-169). But what the comparison portends is not quite clear, and 
one rather suspects an equivocation; the openness in 21.2 is to do with political action not 
historical explanation, and the fact that the people being referred to at 21.2 are people who 
can be called malista aitioi for the hostility between Boeotians and Phocians that led to the 
greater war hardly alters this. The observation about visibility and absence in 18.1-2 
(p.178)—the visibility of Conon’s troops is an incitement to the Rhodians to carry out a 
putsch but during the absence of Conon himself—is quite nice, but I am not sure it adds 
much: Conon was arguably finding a way of acting ouk ek phanerou (though it would require 
the preceding bit of the story to have survived for one to be sure about this), but we are no 
nearer to a historian’s judgement that a prophasis was aphanestatē logōi. The extended 
discussion about seen and unseen in pp.178-183, taking us to miscellaneous passages 
involving issues of gaze and then to HO and Thucydidean ambushes, casts no obvious light 
on theories of historical causality.  Meanwhile, having correctly observed that Thucydides’ 
alēthestatē prophasis entails the existence of other true, but less true, causes, O. does not stop 
to wonder about HO’s observation that those responsible for hostility between Boeotia and 
Phocis were chiefly (malista) certain Thebans: is he implying that there were other people 
or factors that also played a part (e.g. the history of good relations between Boeotia and 
Locris: 21.4) or is malista just an empty verbal flourish? 
Nor does she ever explicitly work out how or whether the Thucydidean scheme of aitiai 
kai diaphorai plus prophasis fits the Corinthian War.  In Thucydidean terms, the truest cause 
is presumably the hatred of Sparta shared by politicians in several states. Timocrates’ gold 
is certainly an enabling factor for the Theban plotters (21.1 is explicit about that), though 
some describe the khrēmata as aitia. It is not clear what sort of cause HO thinks is involved 
here, only that he rejects making the money a prime cause: O. does not seem to comment 
on this, but perhaps she thinks HO’s apparent neglect of the issue an example of his 
tendency (p.163) to simplify things. (As usual, of course, HO’s neglect may only be 
apparent.) But what do we make of the Locrian-Phocian-Boeotian affray? The Thucydidean 
aitiai kai diaphorai are discrete incidents in which Athens was pitted against Corinth, which 
then accused the Athenians to the Spartans of crimes requiring punishment. In 395 Sparta 
eventually acted in defence of Phocians against Locrian-Boeotian attack. So the Phocian 
complaint to Sparta about Boeotia was perhaps like the Corinthian complaint to Sparta 
about Athens. But from HO’s perspective the cause for war is an issue about behaviour of 
Sparta’s enemies, not about Sparta’s behaviour: at least nothing is articulated in what 
survives of HO about Sparta’s motives for helping the Phocians. (In Xenophon, of course, 
Spartans are delighted to have a prophasis for helping Phocis because they are angry at the 
Thebans.) Viewing things from that angle, one asks: what are the aitiai kai diaphorai that 
contrast with the reason of Boeotians and others for war against Sparta? I suppose one 
could say that the affray in central Greece (secretly caused by Theban warmongers) acts as 
a pertinent aitia for other Boeotians who must be made to go to war locally so as to be 
engineered into a war with Sparta that they do not want—rather as the Spartans of 431 
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have to be engineered into a war with Athens that some might want to avoid. But the 
parallel is a bit awkward.   
Of course, different cases have different characteristics and it is no doubt quite proper 
if HO does not force the events of 395 into the formula of 431. But one could expect the 
point to be investigated. O. is no doubt aware that aitioi (in malista aitioi) and aitia (in the 
denial that Timocrates’ khrēmata were aitia for the anti-Sparta coalition) involve a different 
use of aiti- from that in Thucydides’ aitiai kai diaphorai, but the point deserves some 
elaboration, since it may count as an aspect of HO’s reading of Thucydides, a matter of 
general importance, not just in HO’s response to Thucydides’ analysis of political  factions 
(a matter to which O. does pay attention). O. indicates at the start of the chapter that HO 
has a distinctive personal reading of the prophasis-aitia pattern but the discussion that 
follows never quite ties down what it is. Perhaps she has in mind the idea (never argued out 
explicitly: but cf. pp.173-4) that HO is more prone than Thucydides to assign responsibility 
for major events to individuals—though Alcibiades’ personal responsibility in the Argive 
alliance affair (to which O does refer, albeit in a different context: p.176) or the occupation 
of Decelea might seem to count against this.  
I note three other issues connected with causes. (1) O. moots the question of a 
historiographical cliché about manipulative (cf. Thuc.2.1-6 or Hellenica 5.2.25-36, 5.4.20) or 
generally “bad” Thebans (Herodotus 7.222-223; the hubris of the war-causing Thebans in 
395 as per Isocrates 14.27-29).  I am not clear how close she is coming to saying that both 
Xenophon and HO improperly cast Thebans as warmongers in 395 in line with 
contemporary negative views about them and a cliché about manipulative self-
interestedness. To do so would, of course, be in line with her views about the influence on 
HO by the (Athenian) political environment of the 350s/340s (see below). (2) O. professes to 
be interested in Sparta’s motives for action in general and in relation to Agesilaus’ Asiatic 
campaign (p.34). But we do not get a clear discussion of those motives. Nor does she discuss 
whether Sparta’s “activism” was the cause of the Corinthian war. It is a real historical 
question whether the Asiatic campaign itself frightened other Greek cities (because of the 
additional Spartan power that would result from its success) rather than just being a stab-
in-the-back opportunity. (3) p.49 makes a disjunction between Xenophon saying 
Timocrates’ gold caused an interruption of the Asiatic campaign and HO revealing that the 
gold did not cause the Corinthian War, as though this suggests that Xenophon is simply 
wrong about what interrupted the Asiatic campaign. But the campaign was interrupted by 
the outbreak of Corinthian War and the question of the cause of that war is immaterial. O.’s 
argument (p.55) is that the failure of Agesilaus’ forces at Leontoncephalae, Gordium and 
Miletou Teichos and the breakdown of the Spithridates alliance show that a successful 
anabasis was unrealistic. That may well be true, and HO may have wished us to see that it 
was so, but it is not inconsistent with the proximate cause of termination of the campaign 
being events in Greece.   
 
Partisan motivation and the date of HO 
 
O. observes (pp.97-98) that HO’s deployment of the concept of polypragmosunē in 10.2 
involves the re-assignment of a Thucydidean characterisation of all Athenians to a 
particular partisan sub-group. That is true, though the limitation of an erstwhile general 
characterisation to just one part of the Athenian civic body is, of course, merely a reflection 
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of the harder times in which Athenians now lived compared with the glory days of the fifth 
century: it is a change reflecting reality, not a merely literary or historiographical trope. 
The slightly odd thing is that for O. the reality is not that of the 390s but of the mid-fourth 
century.  More specifically (p.89) she claims that HO’s treatment of Corinthian War Athens 
is a projection into past of the Athens of the later Second Confederacy and the Social War 
era—or, slightly more hesitantly (pp.105-6), it is her “suspicion” that HO overdoes 
polypragmosunē (deliberately or ignorantly) because of its currency in the political debates 
of the 350s and 340s. Perhaps it is tolerable idea that HO adapted a Thucydidean trope after 
such a delay. But O. does not do a lot to provide solid validation for her “suspicion”: the 
statement (in the concluding chapter) that the expansionist policy (polypragmosunē) 
ascribed to 390s Athenians is “unrealistical” [sic] because it proved unsuccessful in the 
medium-term hardly counts: people do not only adopt policies that work. Moreover a 
famous sound-bite from Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae (197-198: not mentioned by O.) discloses 
a world divided (on socio-economic grounds) between those who favour war and those who 
do not that does not seem that far from what HO postulates. If one wants an anachronistic 
back projection one might as well suggest that the fear of Spartan partisan intervention, 
which supposedly caused hostility to Sparta in the 390s (10.2-3), was a back projection of 
Spartan political interventions in Mantinea, Phlius, Thebes and Olynthus after the King’s 
Peace. That would provide a much earlier terminus post quem for the composition of HO, but 
would also be unjustified: the Spartan propensity for such behaviour was well established 
and had recently been lavishly displayed both in the Lysander era and in the Elean War. Of 
course, just as people can endorse policies that do not succeed, so they can have fears that 
are paranoid. It is characteristic of the whole problem of dealing with HO that we cannot 
know whether other parts of the work would have revealed whether its author thought 
that they were paranoid in this case. 
 
Envoi 
 
It is a laudable aim to write about HO in its own right, not just as an authorship problem. 
Readers tend to feel that it is a work of some character, and the aspiration to define that 
character is a noble one. For me O.’s book does not quite hit the target. The treatment is too 
unsystematic and the style of argument insufficiently rigorous. But perhaps, after all, there 
is simply not enough surviving text to make the enterprise feasible. HO is fated to remain 
less than the sum of its rather battered parts, and we should acknowledge O.’s 
demonstration of this fact.  
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